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A	GENERAL: CONTRACT AND TORT

On a normative level, Civil Liability in all major legal traditions and legal nomenclatures is a term that denotes heavily liability for damage, that is to say, Tort, extra contractual liability. It is a term that is intended to be used primarily in contrast to criminal liability, two types of liability that need to be distinguished for several important reasons, such as the direct interest and involvement of the State in the case of the latter, the degree to which the injury caused is compensable, the danger or risk for the social order or other, third, parties. But civil liability may also be used as an all embracing concept of liability that is not criminal, including contractual liability. This is clear, especially in some traditions such as the Romanistic (French) tradition, where all civil liability is divided into contractual and extra contractual, but nevertheless even inside those traditions there is some doubt as to whether liability can be given such a generic meaning to include without any difficulty contractual and extra contractual duties. Because Contract is, mainly, about expectations and remedies for unfulfilled expectations, whereas Tort is about damage, and remedies for losses caused by damage. Of course, Contract can also be about damage and losses resulting from damage, but this is only secondary to protecting expectations, while Tort can hardly venture in the area of unfulfilled promises. Unless of course, and not always, there is further damage caused by a promise unfulfilled. 

On a pragmatic level, often contractual promises provide the occasion for further damage, as contracts bring parties together and thus create opportunities for harm, which can be connected to the contractual obligations or be totally unconnected to them. For an example of the former, let’s look at the English case of Greenway, W Dryden, and others v Johnson Matthey Plc​[2]​. Chlorinated or halogenated platinum salts were produced during the refining process undertaken at the employer's chemical factory. Owing to the risk of sensitisation through exposure to the salts, the employer required employees to undergo regular skin prick testing. The appellants were found to have become sensitised and were removed from work involving contact with platinum. They claimed substantial damages for loss of earnings. Platinum sensitisation was symptomless and did not adversely affect day-to-day life. However, it created a susceptibility to developing a platinum allergy if exposure continued. The employer accepted that it had failed in its statutory duties regarding workplace cleaning. But the Court of Appeal held that where the nexus between parties was founded in contract, that contract was the primary source and reference point for their respective rights and obligations. Although a duty of care in tort might run parallel, it was difficult to see how it could impose more extensive obligations than those agreed under the contract. The employer had breached its duty to take all necessary and reasonable steps to ensure its employees' safety at work, but that duty, whether in contract or tort, was focused on protecting employees from physical injury, not from economic harm​[3]​. A standard term or duty of care requiring an employer to protect an employee from economic loss could not be implied into contracts of employment. Furthermore, the instant employer had entered into a collective agreement providing for an ex gratia compensation payment where employees had to leave as a result of platinum allergy​[4]​. It could not reasonably or fairly be said that the employer should be taken to have assumed any wider responsibility for its employees' financial welfare.

But a contract, or contractual negotiations, can provide the nexus between the parties in circumstances in which the damage caused by one of them to the other is unconnected to any contractual obligations assumed. A recent example is Burgess v Lejonvarn ​[5]​ a case in which the claimants were treated more favourably by the High Court than the claimants in Greenway by the Court of Appeal.

There are several other recent examples of how the existence of a contractual or pre-contractual or ‘not quite’ contractual nexus can affect the existence of extra contractual duties. In all of these cases the courts use as a platform the concept of voluntary assumption of responsibility. The case law reveals:

(a) A negative function of assumption of responsibility: if there is no assumption of a specific risk in a contract between two parties, there can also be no assumption of duty in tort. The only (important) exception is when the damage is physical, personal injury, when a Tort duty may independently arise, if such injury is one of the foreseeable consequences of the breach of a contractual term​[6]​. For any other kind of harm, the Contract seems to govern Tort liability​[7]​, and not only by means of an exclusion of liability: caveat promisee! ​[8]​. There may be a contractual estoppel of a claim in tort​[9]​: 
(b) A positive function of assumption of responsibility, if the nexus between the parties is an akin to contract situation​[10]​, or 
(c) . There is held to be a direct assumption of responsibility through Contract​[11]​: 
Significantly, in all cases of a positive result, the causation test that the claimant must satisfy is is the contractual test, not the tortious one, also for the claim in tort ​[12]​-What, therefore, remains of the practical importance of the celebrated concurrence of Tort liability with liability in Contract?​[13]​






(1)	The parameters of the formation of a valid Contract are too narrowly defined in a legal system (such as in the English, under the rules of Consideration and Privity of Contract). These parameters may be kept narrowly defined for wider policy reasons, that do not satisfy  the legal system’s developing judgment as to what is just, fair and reasonable,  in certain situations of direct dealings between two parties. Allowing for an (objective) assumption of liability to operate as the basis of extra-contractual liability can remedy the injustice, avoiding an interference with the (valued) narrow definition of a valid Contract.

(2)	Although the parameters of the formation of a valid Contract are reasonably wide, restrictions imposed in a legal system on liability in Tort (ie limitation of claims in time, narrowly defined vicarious liability and heads and size of damages) may not allow the fair treatment of claims arising out of direct dealings between the parties, in situations in which a valid Contract  cannot be inferred, the generous conditions of formation of Contracts, recognised by the legal system, notwithstanding. This is the case of German law.

(3) Finally, assumption of liability may be used as the basis of extra-contractual liability in order to provide a means of limitation of liability for ‘difficult’ types of negligent harm. Indeed, the idea of assumption of responsibility as the basis of extra-contractual liability first came into existence in both English and German law in connection with claims for the compensation of  types of non-intentional harm other than physical personal injury (prejudice corporel in French law), notably, psychological and psychiatric harm, nervous shock and pure economic loss. 












As is well known, the Common Law conceptions of contract and contractual liability, governed by the twin doctrines of privity and consideration, are narrower than those of German Law. Therefore, unless a mortal blow to these "twin doctrines" was delivered (see infra), in English law, third parties may only exceptionally and indirectly benefit from a contract between others. Firstly, in certain cases prescribed by statute; and, secondly, under the doctrine of "collateral agreements" in common law, or the doctrine of "trust of a promise", originating in Equity. The way in which the doctrine of "collateral agreements" may benefit a third party is illustrated by the example of the buyer who buys goods from a dealer and is given a guarantee signed by the manufacturer; the buyer may sue the manufacturer directly for any defects on the basis of this guarantee which is, in effect, a "collateral" contract. The importance of the equitable exception of "trust of a promise" is harder to assess. There are similarities between this equitable device and the German "contract with a protective effect in favour of a third party" (see infra), but its scope of application is restricted by the proprietary nature and the special function of the institution of trust. For a "trust of a promise" to exist there must be a clear intention of one of the contractual parties to benefit the third party and not the promisee, an intention, in principle, irrevocable. Moreover, such an intention, although necessary, may often be insufficient. The "trust" is, in fact, an institution originating in property law, founded on the existence of a special fiduciary relationship between trustee and beneficiary, and this often is invoked as a reason for the very limited application of the device of “trust of a promise” in commercial transactions. The severity with which the courts pursue the question of the presence of an "instruction to benefit the third party” and their concern about the ''fiduciary'' character of all remaining circumstances, make this device unsuitable for wider application in the field of civil liability in general. Judges, especially Chancery judges, may be influenced by the underlying equitable considerations of a fiduciary situation that turned to the financial disadvantage of a non-contractant plaintiff, as in the case of the Solicitor, who is paid by a client to confer a benefit to a close relative​[17]​. Any remedy granted to the plaintiff in such cases will be in tort.

It is time now, however, to look at certain important developments that are the reason for this paper.


2	The Economic Loss Cases

The idea of assumption of responsibility outside a Contract made its first appearance in English law in connection with claims for the compensation of economic loss, and in the seminal decision of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne v Heller​[18]​, where it was decided that a Bank can be liable for a negligent information supplied without consideration to a regular client. In the more recent case of Henderson Merrett Syndicate Ltd​[19]​, Lord Goff, in looking for the principle which underlay the decision in Hedley Byrne, referred to passages in the speeches of Lord Morris and Lord Devlin in that case including a passage in the speech of Lord Devlin where he considered the sort of relationship which gave rise to a responsibility towards those who act upon information or advice and so created a Duty of Care towards the person so acting.  Lord Devlin had said:   "I do not understand any of your Lordships to hold that it is a responsibility imposed by law upon certain types of persons or in certain sorts of situations.  It is a responsibility that is voluntarily accepted or undertaken, either generally where a general relationship, such as that of solicitor and client or banker and customer, is created, or specifically in relation to a particular transaction." Lord Goff added in Henderson :  "From these statements, and from their application in Hedley Byrne, we can derive some understanding of the breadth of the principle underlying the case. We can see that it rests upon a relationship between the parties, which may be general or specific to the particular transaction, and which may or may not be contractual in nature.  All of their Lordships spoke in terms of one party having assumed or undertaken a responsibility towards the other." In White v Jones​[20]​ (see infra) Lord Goff stated again that the Hedley Byrne principle was "founded upon an assumption of responsibility." In Galoo Ltd (In liq) & Others v Bright Grahame Murray (a firm) and another​[21]​ the Court of Appeal set out to identify the difference between the facts there and those in its previous decision in Morgan Crucible Co Plc v Hill Samuel Bank Ltd​[22]​, that allowed the recovery of an economic loss. The question was when is an adviser, e.g. in this case, an auditor, in close proximity with a person suffering loss by relying on his negligently false advice or information? The answer given by the Court of Appeal in Galoo was, when the auditor 'intends' that the third party, a particular identified person, will rely on it​[23]​. Thus the bidder relying on the auditor's accounts of the target company in Galoo had his claim dismissed, because, although he was personally known to the auditor, it was not 'intended' by the latter that he should rely on his accounts. The leading judgment of Glidewell L. J. relied on Lord Denning's 'classic statement’ in Chandler v Crane Christmas & Co. ​[24]​. The auditor's 'intention' was meant as referring to his knowledge, and willingness, of the reliance of the plaintiff, not any willingness to inflict on him financial injury through such false information. A professional making a false statement in the course of doing his every day job, on the subject-matter of his expertise, will find it hard to shift a presumption of negligence in the error.   The idea of a 'voluntary assumption of responsibility'  was used to explain the importance of 'intended reliance', and in Galoo  it was turned into a new concept of a 'voluntary inter-personal’ relationship, said to  fall short of being a contract only because of lack of consideration proceeding from the plaintiff to the defendant in return for the advice or information​[25]​. In Coulthard and others v Neville Russell (a firm)​[26]​ , the Court of Appeal,  in another case concerning  the civil liability of accountants acting as auditors, considered the issue whether in their function as auditors accountants owed a duty of care to the directors of the audited company to warn on unlawful financial conduct. The Court of Appeal held that the liability of professional advisers for failure to give correct advice or accurate information was in a state of development. It was not possible to say that the present claim was bound to fail and therefore the appeal of the auditors should be dismissed. This was an area ‘In which the law is developing pragmatically and incrementally. It is pre‑eminently an area in which the legal result is sensitive to the facts’. In Spring v Guardian Assurance plc & others​[27]​, the plaintiff had applied for work in the financial services industry and sought a personal reference letter from his former employers, a leading insurance firm. The employment rules of the financial services industry required that such a reference be sought and given.  It was given, but it was unfavourable, and was found by the trial judge to constitute a negligent mis‑statement. In the House of Lords it had to be considered whether a duty of care was owed to the plaintiff. Lord Goff reached an affirmative conclusion on the basis of Hedley Byrne. He said: ‘Where the plaintiff entrusts the defendant with the conduct of his affairs, in general or in particular, the defendant may be held to have assumed responsibility to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff to have relied on the defendant to exercise due skill and care, in respect of such conduct.’ But both Lord Goff and Lord Woolf approved in Spring the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in South Pacific Manufacturing Company Limited v New Zealand Security Consultants and investigations Ltd​[28]​, where it was held that an investigator reporting on the causes of a fire to an insurance company owed no duty of care to the insured whose claim was rejected because of the allegedly inaccurate report.  Lord Goff found that there had been no assumption of responsibility by the investigator to the insured in that case, and Lord Woolf said that the report of the investigator was made pursuant to their contractual duty to the insurer.
Another example of similar type, is Baker v Kaye​[29]​. The High Court held that a medical practitioner retained by a company to carry out pre‑employment medical assessments of its prospective employees owes a duty of care to those whom he assesses in carrying out his assessment and in reporting his conclusion;  the defendant was, therefore, under a duty to the plaintiff to take reasonable care in carrying out the medical assessment in connection with the job offer, and in making a judgment as to the plaintiff's suitability for employment by reference to the employers' requirements. It was held to be a duty of care that fulfilled all the legal requirements: namely, foreseeability of economic loss, the necessary degree of proximity between the parties and the proviso that it should be just, fair and  reasonable in all the circumstances for a duty to be imposed. Not only was it clear that economic loss was a foreseeable consequence of a breach of the duty, but there was also sufficient proximity between the parties to give rise to a duty of care, as the defendant knew that the plaintiff's employment by the company depended solely on the assessment and that to make a non‑recommendation could have serious financial consequences. Finally, it was just, fair and reasonable for such a duty to be imposed; there was no conflict between the proper discharge of the defendant's contractual duty to the prospective employers and any duty to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was dependent upon the medical assessment made by the defendant. The latter was, however, found not liable, as it was not shown that he had breached his duty of care in his assessment of the plaintiff’s fitness for the job. But in Kapfunde v Abbey National Plc and another​[30]​, the Court of Appeal, in considering the same question, ie the question whether in assessing the appellant’s suitability for employment by Abbey National Plc, a medical practitioner, employed by Abbey National for that purpose, owed her a duty of care, reached a negative conclusion. The Court held that a duty of care will generally be owed to the person to whom a statement is made and who relies on it. In the case of a bank reference or medical report, this is normally the person who asks for it or commissions it. A reference by an employer, however, is likely to be regarded as provided to the former employee, who is the subject of the reference, for his use ‘as a passport to future employment’, rather than as a service to any particular prospective new employer. The Court disapproved of the Judge’s conclusion as to the existence of a duty of care in Baker v Kaye (supra). The doctor’s advice is given to the employer or insurer and not to the applicant for a job, who is a patient only in the sense that he is the subject of the examination and advice. The doctor is, therefore, taken to assume responsibility for his advice only to the employer or insurer who commissioned it, and not to the patient.

White  and another v  Jones  and others​[31]​, is a case where a solicitor was found liable to the intended beneficiaries of his client, the testator, who died before the solicitor came round to drawing up a will under instructions to confer a benefit on them. The House of Lords (Lord Keith and Lord Mustill dissenting) held that where a solicitor accepted instructions to draw up a will and as the result of his negligence an intended beneficiary under the will was deprived of a legacy the solicitor was liable for the loss of the legacy. Lord Goff and Lord Nolan based their decision on extending the assumption of responsibility by the solicitor towards his client in law to an intended beneficiary. But they made it clear that this assumption of responsibility existed only if the loss of the beneficiary was foreseeable to the solicitor, and if the circumstances of the situation were that there was no confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties, and neither the testator nor his estate had a remedy against the solicitor. Tort liability was appropriate in such circumstances only because otherwise an injustice would occur, as a result of a lacuna in the law and there would be no remedy for the loss caused by the solicitor's negligence to the beneficiary. Lord Browne‑Wilkinson and Lord Nolan held that the principle of assumption of responsibility should be extended to a solicitor who accepted instructions to draw up a will, holding him to be in a special relationship with those intended to benefit under it.

White v Jones extended in law the expert adviser’s assumption of responsibility to his client’s beneficiaries. This has given rise to the question of whether an expert advising trustees owes a duty of care to the beneficiaries of the trust. In the case of Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan  ​[32]​, Lord Nicholls, giving the judgment of the Privy Council, said​[33]​:
"...... it is difficult to identify a compelling reason why, in addition to the duty of skill and care vis‑a‑vis the Trustees which the third parties have accepted, or which the law has imposed upon them, third parties should also owe a duty of care directly to the beneficiaries". In the very recent case of Hogg Robinson Trustees Ltd. and others v J. Alsford Pensions Trustees Ltd. and others​[34]​, there is further evidence of the Courts being unwilling to generally recognise third-party liability for economic loss to beneficiaries, in the absence of a lacuna in the law, similar to that which gave ground to the House of Lords to accept the claim of the testator’s beneficiaries in White v Jones. A fiduciary relationship (and, therefore, also a special relationship) will, normally, exist only between third parties and trustees, and, of course, trustees and beneficiaries. In Hemmens v Wilson Browne ​[35]​, a settlor instructed a solicitor to draft a document giving the plaintiff an immediately enforceable right to call at a future date for a sum of £110,000.  After the settlor had executed a document drafted by the solicitor, the latter told the plaintiff that the effect of the document was 'akin to a trust' but advised her to consult her own solicitors if she had any doubt in the matter.  It ought to have been known to the solicitor that the document failed to give the plaintiff any enforceable right.  When the plaintiff called on the settlor to perform his promise he was no longer willing to do so and declined to pay her the promised sum.  The plaintiff claimed damages for negligence against the solicitor. The court held that a solicitor might be held to owe a duty of care to the intended beneficiary of an inter vivos transaction who had suffered damage which it was beyond the power of the settlor to put right, but such a duty of care could not be said to exist in all cases of inter vivos transactions. Although it was foreseeable that by failing to exercise due care the defendant might cause the plaintiff loss and although there was a sufficient degree of proximity between them, it was not ‘fair, just or reasonable’ to give her a remedy against him since the settlor remained capable of fulfilling his original intention and retained a remedy in contract against the solicitor if he chose to exercise it (no lacuna in the law as in White v Jones). If the solicitor’s client is alive, the client can sue the solicitor for his negligence to confer his benefit on the beneficiary, and this takes care of the need to give the beneficiary an independent action in tort​[36]​. But the liability of solicitors was extended recently in Carr-Glynn v Frearsons (a firm),​[37]​, in a case where they had negligently failed to severe a joint tenancy and thus confer a benefit in their client’s will to her niece, on the basis of an assumption of responsibility towards the latter (with whom the solicitors had no contract). And in the latest case of Johnson v Gore Vidal​[38]​, the court upheld the possibility of a similar assumption of responsibility of solicitors towards a company shareholder for his personal loss, although there was no lacuna in the law as suggested by White v Jones.
In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, Lord Goff said​[39]​: ‘an assumption of responsibility coupled with the concomitant reliance may give rise to a tortious duty of care irrespective of whether there is a contractual relationship between the parties, and in consequence, unless his contract precludes him from doing so, the plaintiff, who has available to him concurrent remedies in contract and tort, may choose that remedy which appears to him to be most advantageous.'  The defendants in that case were the providers of services as managers of underwriting syndicates.  Lord Goff also said​[40]​:   'It is however my understanding that by the law in this country contracts for services do contain an implied promise to exercise reasonable care (and skill) in the performance of the relevant services . . .’ And:  'Attempts have been made to explain how doctors and dentists may be concurrently liable in tort while other professional men may not be so liable, on the basis that the former cause physical damage whereas the latter cause  pure economic loss . . . But this explanation is not acceptable, if only because some professional men, such as architects, may also be responsible for physical damage.  As a matter of principle, it is difficult to see why concurrent remedies in tort and contract, if available against the medical profession, should also not be available against members of other professions, whatever form the relevant damage may take.'​[41]​ And in Holt and another v Payne Skillington and another​[42]​ the Court of Appeal confirmed that where there are concurrent claims in contract and tort for professional negligence, it is possible that the scope of the duty in tort may be wider than that in contract.

The existence of a contract between plaintiff and defendant is undisputable proof of an assumption of a duty of care by the latter to the former; and the recognition of the concurrence of contractual and tortious remedies by English law is hardly surprising, in the light of the narrow scope of contractual liability. The interesting question is whether the terms of the contract can be allowed to circumscribe the scope of the duty in tort. This would be unacceptable, if the latter is to be seen as arising ex lege (as it normally is). But not so, if its existence depends on a (voluntary) assumption of responsibility. Assumption of responsibility is, however, as we shall now see, a troubled concept. It is objective, and does not depend on the will or knowledge of the defendant. To that extent, the tort duty that comes from it can be, and is, independent from the will of the parties as expressed in the contract that embodies the assumption of responsibility (subject to lawful limitation or exclusion of liability).​[43]​
A most interesting case is that of Williams and another v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd and Mistlin ​[44]​. The main question in this case was whether a director of a franchisor company is personally liable to franchisees for loss which they suffered as a result of negligent advice given to them by his company.  At first instance Langley J.​[45]​ answered that question in the affirmative, and the majority of the Court of Appeal​[46]​ upheld this conclusion and dismissed the defendant’s appeal. The dispute arose in the context of a marketing system known as business format franchising.  It involves a contractual licence under which the franchisor permits a franchisee to carry on business under a trade name belonging to the franchisor.  The franchisor provides advice and assistance to the franchisee about the manner in which the franchisee does business and exercises some control over it. In return the franchisee pays stipulated fees to the franchisor. Encouraged by a brochure and a prospectus supplied to them by the appellant-defendant, the respondents-plaintiffs entered into a franchise agreement with the defendant’s company.  The respondents took a lease of shop premises and set up business.  The turnover proved substantially less than predicted by the defendant’s company. The plaintiffs’ business traded at a loss over 18 months and then ceased trading. In the House of Lords, all judges concurred with Lord Steyn’s speech, allowing the defendant’s appeal. 





Lord Steyn went on to explain ‘the practical application of the extended Hedley Byrne principle’. This was firmly based on the idea of assumption of responsibility, itself indicating an assumption of the risk of financial loss by the issuer of a statement or advice: ‘Two matters require consideration.  First, there is the approach to be adopted as to what may in law amount to an assumption of risk.  This point was elucidated in Henderson's case by Lord Goff of Chieveley.  He observed, at p.181:   "especially in a context concerned with a liability which may arise under a contract or in a situation 'equivalent to contract,' it must be expected that an objective test will be applied when asking the question whether, in a particular case, responsibility should be held to have been assumed by the defendant to the plaintiff: . . .". Lord Steyn pointed out that, also in his view, the basis of liability is not the state of mind of the defendant.  The test is objective; this means that the primary focus must be on things said or done by the defendant or on his behalf in dealings with the plaintiff.  What was crucial for his Lordship, however, was that the assumption of responsibility should have occurred directly, in a bi-lateral relationship between defendant and plaintiff. But in the present case there was a triangular position: the prospective franchisees, the franchisor company, and the director-defendant. In such a case where the personal liability of the director is in question the internal arrangements between a director and his company cannot be the foundation of a director's personal liability in tort.  ‘The inquiry must be’, said Lord Steyn, ‘whether the director, or anybody on his behalf, conveyed directly or indirectly to the prospective franchisees that the director assumed personal responsibility towards the prospective franchisees’.  
But if personal assumption of responsibility is the basis of liability, reliance by the plaintiff on the advice or information given is also necessary to establish the causal link between the assumption of responsibility and the loss. The test is not, however, simply reliance in fact.  ‘The test is’, said Lord Steyn, ‘whether the plaintiff could reasonably rely on an assumption of personal responsibility by the individual who performed the services on behalf of the company’. In plain words, whether the plaintiff relied in fact or not on the defendant’s assumption of responsibility has nothing to do with it; what matters is if, in law, he is entitled to so rely, whether, as the mantra of recent judicial pronouncements goes, ‘it is just, fair and reasonable’ for him to so rely.​[48]​

Both assumption of responsibility and reasonable reliance are, therefore, normative devices serving legal policy; neither rules of law, nor fact. But as Lord Steyn said: ‘Coherence must sometimes yield to practical justice. In any event, the restricted conception of contract in English law, resulting from the combined effect of the principles of consideration and privity of contract, was the backcloth against which Hedley Byrne was decided and the principle developed in Henderson. In The Pioneer Container [ 1994]  2 AC 324, [ 1994]  2 All ER 250 at p 335 of the former report, Lord Goff of Chieveley (giving the judgment of the Privy Council in a Hong Kong appeal) said  that it was open to question how long the principles of consideration and privity of contract will continue to be maintained.  It may become necessary for the House of Lords to re‑examine the principles of consideration and privity of contract.  But while the present structure of English contract law remains intact the law of tort, as the general law, has to fulfil an essential gap‑filling role. In these circumstances there was, and is, no better rationalisation for the relevant head of tort liability than assumption of responsibility’. 








In Leach v Chief Constable of Gloucestershire​[49]​, the Court of Appeal accepted an assumption of responsibility for psychiatric harm.  The plaintiff was asked by the police to assist in the interrogation of a serial killer, by being present as ‘an appropriate adult’, during police interviews and also in the police cell where he was kept, as required by the practice code of the police; she suffered severe psychological trauma while listening to him confessing gruesome details of his murders, but was at no point either offered, or advised to get, expert help or counselling. The Court refused to strike out her claim as one disclosing no action in law, pointing out that there should be no difference between physical and psychiatric harm when an assumption of responsibility is concerned. Such an assumption of responsibility, leading to the creation of a Duty of Care, was to be objectively recognised by the law in a case like this, where the defendant police force was deriving, without any consideration, the benefit of the plaintiff’s assistance in their inquiries.




















Ideas of assumption of responsibility as the basis of a Vetrauenshaftung first were developed in Germany by the fertile mind of Rudolf von Jehring in the last century, who first suggested the concept of culpa in contrahendo as a general principle of the Law of Obligations​[51]​. The German Civil Code shows evidence of acceptance of the principle only indirectly in sporadic limited provisions such as Paras. 397, 309, 523 Abs.1, 524 Abs.2, 800 and 694 BGB, that set out the compensation of certain instances of ‘Vertrauensschaden’. The late Karl Larenz points out that these provisions alone are not enough to legitimise the adoption of a general principle of culpa in contrahendo (which he carefully calls ‘schuldhaftes Verhalten bei den Vertragsverhandlungen’), but he accepts that such a principle has now been created by a development of the law in Jurisprudence and Doctrine​[52]​. Similarly, Larenz acknowledges the judicial extension of the device of ‘Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung fuer Dritte’, despite the lack of express legislative recognition in the BGB​[53]​. This device was invented, in the first place, to fill a gap in the delictual protection of victims of injuries caused by servants or employees of organisations (or due to organisational failures), in the light of the defective system of vicarious liability of Para. 831 BGB. But it also serves to extend, at the discretion of the judges who develop the law, like their English brethren, ‘incrementally’ (bei Fallgruppen), the more favourable regime of Contractual liability​[54]​ to the benefit of third parties in deserving cases, and, also, to allow the recovery of negligent economic loss in controlled circumstances​[55]​.  This remarkable exercise in judicial creativity would have been probably impossible to accommodate within the legislative frame of the BGB, but for the existence of the all-permeating, gigantic Good Faith clause of Para. 242 BGB​[56]​.






In Germany, the judicial expansion of the scope of contractual liability to include "selected" third parties in  the form of new devices , such as the contract with a "protective effect" in favour of a third party, and even culpa in contrahendo in favour of a third party​[57]​, has been aggressive​[58]​. Amidst some kind of initial dogmatic confusion a number of scholars started to speak of a "tortious liability on contractual principles". Disappointed buyers of defective products in Germany, who are unable to show that the product caused them to suffer external physical injury, turned to contractual devices to gain judicial access to a non-seller manufacturer. The first new device to be tested in a court of law was the "contract with a protective effect in favour of a third party"​[59]​ . Thus, it was argued in a case before the Federal Supreme Civil Court (BGH), that this device entitled the buyer to sue the manufacturer for his financial harm, because the contract of sale between manufacturer and seller had a "protective effect" in favour of the buyer​[60]​. As the BGH had put it in an earlier case, "third parties are to be brought within the protective ambit of a contract if the duty of care and protection arising from the contract should be owed in good faith and in accordance with the purpose of the contract, not only to the contracting party but also to certain other persons”​[61]​. That being the case, it would have been reasonable to expect that German courts would not be prepared to tolerate the wider use of the protective effect of a contract, outside the context in which it was originally intended; especially, in relation to a kind of harm specifically rejected as worthy of the protection of the law in the Civil Code, such as nonpremeditated financial harm (see supra). It is, therefore, not surprising that the BGH refused to accept the buyer's argument in the case mentioned above, on the basis that a wider use of the new device would frustrate the legislator's intent as expressed clearly in Paras. 823 et seq., BGB. The court also referred, in justification of its decision, to an important condition that the BGH itself had implanted, on an earlier occasion, into the institution of the contract with a "protective effect," as a "control" device. That condition was that a third party (in our case the buyer of a defective product) may, in principle, be brought within the protective ambit of a contract between others (in our case between the seller and the manufacturer) only when connected with one of the contracting parties by a "special relationship". Importantly, this relationship would have to be, furthermore, of a "personal nature", according to standing BGH jurisprudence​[62]​ , and could not arise in an ordinary contract of sale. The same BGH jurisprudence holds that a "personal relationship" would have to be, more often than not, a relationship founded on a family or employment dependency​[63]​. The plaintiff in the product liability case, a purchaser of defective water pipes and now liable for the injury that they caused to a third party, a local authority, also advanced the alternative argument that he had a right of action against the manufacturer of the defective pipes on the basis of a relationship of "reliance" or "trust" ("Vertrauen")​[64]​ , that arose from the chain of sales connecting the manufacturer (through the seller down the line) to him as ultimate buyer, and justified his reasonable reliance on the quality of the products. This "trustrelationship", the plaintiff argued, ought to give him a direct, quasicontractual, remedy against the manufacturer​[65]​ . But the BGH rejected the plaintiff's contention, in a passage of the judgment that is worth extracting here in its original form: "Die Annahme eines uber die Deliktshaftung hinausgehenden besonderen Schutzverhaltnisses, des sich etwa nach den fur culpa in contrahendo entwickelten Rechtsgrundsatzen, die in der Regel nur Vertrauensschaden erfassen, auch auf siese Schaden ersteckt, obwohl es an einem rechtsgeschaftlichen Kontakt zwischen Schadiger und Geschadigtem fehlt....wurde die im geltenden Haftungssystem bewusst gezogene Grenze zwischen vertraglichem und deliktischem Bereich weitgehend aufheben ohne sie durch einen rechtlich und wirtschaftlich praktikabeleren Masstab zu ersetzen". And: "Sollten ohne entsprehende Parteiabreden Vertrags und nicht nur Deliktsgrundsatze auf die Haftung des Warenherstellers in Fallen der vorliegenden Art ersteckt werden, so kann dies nur im Zuge einer Neuordnung des Kaufrechts zu rechtlich und wirtschaftlich annehmbaren Ergebnissen fuhren....Diese aber muss der Entscheidung des Gesetzgebers vorbehalten bleiben; eine etwaige rechtspolitische Zweckmassigkeit oder Notwendigkeit allein legitimiert die Rechtsprechung nicht dazu"​[66]​. The last passage of the BGH judgment is especially noteworthy, also in a broader sense. It illustrates the extent to which German Law, unlike English law, depends on legislative action, rather than judicial activism, for primary development and change. And it shows the degree to which this lawmaking "primacy" of the legislator may enhance the survival chances of, even outdated, existing principle.


3	‘Vetrauenshaftung’ : Time for a new general principle?

The above conclusion notwithstanding, in important recent German cases​[67]​, reliance considerations (Vetrauensgedanken) appear as the principal ground of liability for incorrect advice or information outside Contract, and now look as clearly been behind the device of a Contract with a protective effect towards a third party and culpa in contrahendo. And although the BGH shows a preference for the former device as the undisputed basis of liability to third parties for incorrect advice or information outside Contract​[68]​, influential writers such as Professor von Canaris (admittedly with a strong personal record of support for Vertrauenshaftung as an independent source of liability) point out that the future belongs to the device of culpa in contrahendo arising from the justified reliance of the third party on the information or advice being correct. This seems to be supported in one of the latest BGH decisions mentioned above, where an important consideration that influenced the court’s decision seems to have been that the surveyor knew that his survey would be shown to the third party prior to their decision to agree to a mortgage on the property of the surveyor’s client. Canaris argues that the emancipation of liability for incorrect financial information or advice in German law from the device of Contract with a protective effect towards a third party is inevitable, if the third party’s loss, arising from justified reliance, is to be compensated irrespective of any contractual conditions restrictive of liability in the contract between the informer or adviser and his client. Canaris argues that this is a necessary consequence of the acceptance of the principle of justifiable reliance as the umbrella under which the latest BGH decision now places both devices of Contract with a protective effect towards a third party and culpa in contrahendo​[69]​.







D	ENGLISH AND GERMAN LAW COMPARED

Whereas English law needs the principle of assumption of responsibility because of a narrow concept of Contractual liability, German law uses the same principle to compensate for a narrow concept of Tort liability. What is interesting is that the principle offers to both legal systems a natural path to a novel kind of civil liability, besides the traditional two of Contractual and Tortious liability that shows in its construction elements of both of those other two. It is, in the first place, and similar to Tort liability, objective, i.e. it does not depend on proof of an actual intention to assume responsibility by the defendant, and proof of absence of such an actual intention by the defendant is no defence​[73]​. Rather than the intention of the defendant, it is the circumstances of his relationship with the plaintiff, including, most importantly, any interest or benefit of the former in inducing the latter’s conduct, that determine the existence of an assumption of responsibility in the eyes of the law. Secondly, and similar to Contract liability, this new kind of civil liability is based on a personal assumption of responsibility, that would amount to Contract in English law but for the requirement of Consideration missing, and has originated in Contract in German law, as a natural extension of the Vertragliches Verschulden before (culpa in contrahendo, also towards third parties) and after (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung fuer Dritte) the making of the Contract. This personal responsibility must, furthermore, appear to be ‘voluntary’, which means that it has its origin in the free action of the defendant and not in a duty otherwise imposed on the defendant by law. In so holding, the House of Lords ​[74]​ closed the door to liability based on an assumption of responsibility in cases of legal duties imposed ex lege, where the question will be what the appropriate scope of the legal duty is. Liability for assumption of responsibility thus remains a principle founded on free will and personal interest, much as contractual liability is, and finds its justification, as contractual liability does, in the profit or any other advantage that the defendant expected from their action. 
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